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Abstract: This article examines controversies surrounding the
implementation of the first colonial indigenous health service, the
Assistance Médicale, in Cambodia. It characterizes individual and
group behaviours in the immediate social conditions of colonial
Cambodian society, as well as some of the paradoxes of the
modernization narrative ascribed to the colonial science of this
period. This discussion supports a more general aim of furthering
the understanding of Khmer political behaviour in the colonial
period. A history of medical controversies reveals the changing
nature of indigenous response to the colonial state, and provides
alternative models to existing tropes of Khmer socio-political
behaviour.
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France had a colonial presence in Cambodia from 1863 to 1954. The
colonial government organized an indigenous health service, the
Assistance Médicale, for Indo-China in 1905, although Cambodia’s
service did not effectively begin until 1907. Just as in Europe, the
economically debilitating epidemic diseases that regularly afflicted South
East Asia provided a major impetus for a health service for the indig-
enous populations. This article will examine some of the controversies
surrounding the implementation of colonial epidemic-control measures
and the first colonial health service in Cambodia, the Assistance Médicale
(AM). It will characterize individual and group choices in the immedi-
ate social conditions of colonial Cambodian society as well as some of
the paradoxes of the modernization narrative ascribed to the colonial
science of this period.
The intersection between Western (French) medicine and Khmer health
provides a unique opportunity in this regard, because the introduction
of French medicine in Cambodian society provoked a gamut of
responses from the native population. Healing, sickness and death are
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tightly linked to the ‘cultural substratum’ of a society, and aspects of
medicine introduced by the French were immediately and deeply
intrusive into native social life. Intended to discriminate only between
the healthy and the sick, these measures impacted on all walks of life –
from elite to peasant, immigrant to native, colonizer to colonized.1 By
examining reactions to the plague, a disease whose aetiology was just
being elucidated during this period, this article will also illustrate the
contingent nature of ‘modernity’ in colonial Cambodia. The process of
medical modernization was being experienced simultaneously by
colonizer and colonized, creating conflicts within the European
community as well as between the European and the indigenous popu-
lation. Ultimately, keeping up with medical developments could be as
challenging for the French administrator as the Khmer villager. Claims
to ‘modernity’ during this threshold historical moment were tenuous
for both the Frenchman and the Cambodian.
This discussion also supports a more general aim: to further the
limited understanding of Khmer political behaviour in the colonial
period. The institution of the Western bureaucratic state occurred at
the same historical moment as the implementation of new public health
policies. As such, Khmer responses to medical measures were negoti-
ated within multiple and shifting understandings of the relationship
between the individual and the state. The analyses of medical contro-
versies and conflicts in this period provide alternative models to existing
tropes of Khmer socio-political behaviours.
The article first reviews the (scant) history of resistance in Cambodia. It
then moves to episodes of the plague in Phnom Penh as a way to dis-
cuss protest and resistance among elite society in an urban setting. The
confusion among French policy makers during these epidemics also
highlights the tenuous nature of ‘modern’ thinking in this period. The
narrative then moves away from the plague and the city to a discussion
of active indigenous resistance to French medicine among the largely
rural communities in the country. The range of responses to medical
measures reveals an important, historically neglected aspect of
colonial resistance. Rather than working backwards from large-scale
rebellions to identify conditions that created them, this section focuses
on these middle-ground events (neither ‘everyday resistance’ nor wide-
scale rebellion) to understand how non-elite and elite society
1 Of course, ideal intentions did not determine results, as discrimination on other grounds
occurred.
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conceptualized the grey area between extreme duress and everyday
calm. These intermediate-level disturbances reveal that economics are
not always the only or even the best way to determine what people will
fight to protect.
The peaceable kingdom
In existing historical studies of the colonial period, Cambodia presents
an overall veneer of calm. If we characterize the 1884–86 rebellion as
the last major struggle against the imposition of colonial rule,
Cambodia witnessed little unrest during the colonial period, particu-
larly in contrast to the centuries of destructive warfare that preceded
and the bloody decades that followed it. However, while the colonial
period was peaceful in political terms, it would be inaccurate to label it
a period of non-violence. Political peace was not social peace; low-
level violence was an aspect of everyday life. The political calm is in
keeping with French colonial tropes of the timid and peaceful
Buddhist Khmer. However, observers did not only view Khmers as quiet
and shy; Khmer social historiography focuses disproportionate
attention on the exceptions to such behaviour. Etienne Aymonier, an
early French scholar of Cambodia, observed in personal correspond-
ence in the 1880s that the Khmer race was very slow to anger, but once
aroused, had an absolute lack of pity or compassion.2 Three decades
later, Dr Adrien Pannetier would claim that the mild Cambodian
peasant, if pushed, ‘was capable of fiery rages’ like a ‘crazed sheep’
(mouton devenue fou).3 A late colonial writer would remark, ‘the
Cambodian’s passivity in the face of Annamite infiltration is very
often noted. Rather than struggle against the persistent invader, he
prefers to leave home and move away, retaliating against him in
sudden fits of anger, with robbery and murder’.4 Another would write
‘the Khmers are extra-ordinarily long-suffering…yet their outbursts
are terrible when they have been goaded beyond endurance’.5
Observers of Khmer culture find this gentle/violent dichotomy so
striking that many have proposed a variety of explanations. In contrast
2 Fonds Aymonier, Archives of the Société Asiatique, Paris.
3 Pannetier, A., and Verneau, R. (1921), ‘Contribution a l’étude des Cambodgiens’,
L’Anthropologie, Vol 31, pp 279–317, p 311.
4 Robequain, C. (1944), The Economic Development of French Indo-China, Oxford
University Press, New York, p 18.
5 Thompson, V. M. (1937), French Indo-China, Macmillan, New York, p 324.
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to scholarship on similar phenomena such as Malaysian amok, the ‘Cam-
bodian’ phenomenon is often parochialized.6 For example, French scholar
Alain Forest has argued that the cult of the neak-ta
creates intense pressures to conform in Khmer peasant society. An
individual does not break with the rules of the society unless some
wholly unacceptable situation has driven him to relinquish his role as a
social entity.7 In such a state, he presumably gives free rein to any
suppressed anti- or a-social behaviours. This interpretation however is
in direct conflict with two anthropological studies of Khmer village
life written in the 1960s, both of which noted the remarkable social
tolerance for individualistic or idiosyncratic behaviour among
villagers.8 Finding the roots of this ‘unique cultural trait’ seems to hold
such fascination because it is inculpated in the startling violence of the
Pol Pot era.9 Historical teleology casts the stain of the Khmer Rouge
era back into the colonial period and before it.
It is said that social connections in pre-colonial and colonial
Cambodia were largely vertical rather than horizontal; this perhaps dis-
courages the ‘class identity’ sought out by Marxist scholars, and leads
such scholars to discount Khmer political consciousness. As one Marxist
scholar writes, no significant peasant movements arose because of the
individualistic anarchy resulting from ‘the lack of corporate units above
the family’.10 However, the predominance of vertical ties in social
6 See, for example, Benedict, R. (1968), ‘The relativity of normality’, in Fried, M. H.,
ed, Readings in Anthropology, Thomas Crowell Co, New York, pp 791–808; Spores,
J. C. (1988), Running Amok: An Historical Inquiry, Ohio University Center for In-
ternational Studies, Athens, OH.
7 Forest, A. (1992), Le culte des genies protecteurs au Cambodge: Analysis et traduc-
tion d’un corpus de textes sur les neak ta, Harmattan, Paris, p 91.
8 Ebihara, M. (1971), ‘Svay, a rice growing village: 1958–1960’, PhD thesis, Anthro-
pology Department, Columbia University, New York, pp 420–423; and Martel, G.
(1975), Lovea, village des environs d’Angkor: Aspects demographiques, economiques
et sociologiques du monde rural cambodgien dans la province de Siem-Reap, Ecole
Française d’Extrême Orient, Paris.
9 Tropes of the binary Khmer character exist to the present day, as scholars resort to
terms such as ‘the killer behind the gentle smile’ to explain the violence of the 1975–
78 period in Cambodian history, when a ‘social revolution’ led by former schoolteacher
Pol Pot resulted in the deaths of nearly one million Khmers at the hands of other
Khmers. Pol Pot himself seems to be the binary Khmer personality par excellence.
See, for example, Chandler, D. (1992), Brother Number One: A Political Biography
of Pol Pot, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
10 Vickery, M. (1984), Cambodia, 1975–1982, South End Press, Boston, MA, pp 13–
14. He is seconded by a controversial study by Jan Ovesen, which argues that social
obligation in a Khmer village does not extend beyond the family. Ovesen, J. (1996),
When Every Household is an Island: Social Organization and Power Structures in
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organization is not unique to Cambodian society, although some claim
that Cambodia is unusual in being almost completely devoid of
horizontal social obligations beyond the level of family.11 But the weak-
ness of permanent horizontal obligations in itself does not preclude
mass social movements. The protest events discussed below, such as
the 1916 Affair, reveal traditional forms of group protest that are not
premised on permanent group structure or identity.
Analysis of contentious politics in Khmer society suffers from these
associations. Dissension is, within this existing framework, sporadic,
atavistic, violent and parochial. Grievances are largely personal in
nature. Ultimately, the tension between the atavistic ‘hidden temper’
of the Khmer, their general temerity, social incohesion and the rarity of
anticolonial protest has not been resolved in studies of the region. If
anything, these tropes obscure rather than explain the nature of the
Khmer response to French colonial government. By examining a range
of medical protests in Cambodia with respect to the changing relation-
ship between the individual and the state, this article will propose the
groundwork for a more fruitful model of protest behaviours in the Khmer
context.
Quotidian violence
Low-level violence was clearly an aspect of everyday life in rural
Cambodia. The one Khmer monograph recording society and customs
in the late nineteenth century describes hardship, ritual killing, and
torture of prisoners as commonplace.12 We also have evidence that
human sacrifice was practised into the colonial period.13 The frequent
Rural Cambodia, Department of Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala University, Sida,
Uppsala, Sweden.
11 As Anthony Reid writes, ‘All the evidence we have suggests that vertical bonding is
very ancient and central to almost all Southeast Asian societies, and cannot help-
fully be portrayed as an external or recent factor’. Reid, A. (2000), Charting the
Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singa-
pore, p 185.
12 Tauch, C. (1994), Battambang During the Time of the Lord Governor, CEDORECK,
Phnom Penh, pp 25, 47–49.
13 Aymonier observes that in Kompong Svay in the mid-nineteenth century, human
victims were sacrificed around the April water festival. He notes that during the time
of his writing (1883), ‘those condemned to death are not executed in their villages.
Without a special order to decapitate them in the place of the crime, they are con-
ducted in a grand “cortege” to the protector tree of the province, with their execution
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references to murder, banditry and warfare in Khmer folklore also point
to the mundane nature of violence. However, large-scale or ‘political’
violence was rare. Unlike neighbouring Vietnam, the Protectorate had
few massive upheavals or social conflicts. The lack of obvious drama
might explain the sparse historiography of the period. Historians have
singled out two events partially as exceptions proving this rule, the so-
called ‘1916 Affair’ and the murder of French administrator Felix Bardez.
These events merit a brief review because I argue, in contrast to some
scholarship, that they suggest traditional forms of protest that were
utilized in other contexts in the colonial era.
The 1916 Affair began in November 1915, when hundreds of
peasants travelled to Phnom Penh to petition for the King’s inter-
cession against excessive taxation and corvée. The aggrieved peasants
camped out en masse before the Royal Palace. The location is signifi-
cant. We will see with other demonstrations that group complaints were
also presented to the Royal Palace rather than the French colonial head-
quarters. The King addressed the petitioners, promising them that the
situation would be alleviated. The crowd, seemingly satisfied, dispersed.
However, the movement resumed in January 1916, when thousands of
peasants from all over the country began arriving at the Royal Palace,
all to request relief from the King. The movement had no identified
leadership: huge groups with little organization left their villages and
travelled to submit grievances personally to the King. Some records
estimate that as many as 100,000 petitioners from throughout the country
arrived at the Palace.14 It was ultimately a non-violent demonstration
and eventually dispersed. No Frenchman was injured or attacked dur-
ing this movement. This, as observed by one administrator, was
exceptional for a colonial protest.15 Milton Osborne contends that the
Affair is representative of a new proto-political peasant behaviour.16 I
becoming a sort of sacrifice to the genies. . . . These practices would seem to be the
vestiges of real human sacrifices which took place up to that time.’ Aymonier, E.
(1984/83), Notes sur les coutumes et croyances superstitieuses des cambodgiens,
CEDORECK, Paris, p 56. David Chandler theorizes that two prisoners of war were
beheaded in 1877 on royal orders at the sacred site of Ba Phnom as an offering to the
neak ta known as ‘white mother’, and the new agricultural year. Chandler, D. (1974),
‘Royally sponsored human sacrifice in nineteenth century Cambodia: the cult of the
Nak Ta Me Sa (Mahisasuramardini) at Ba Phnom’, Journal of the Siam Society, Vol
62, No 2, pp 207–222.
14 Osborne, M. (1978), ‘Peasant politics in Cambodia: the 1916 affair’, Modern Asian
Studies, Vol 12, No 2, pp 217–243.
15 Pannetier and Verneau, supra note 3 at p 311.
16 Osborne, supra note 14  at p 240.
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would argue, in contrast, that this behaviour is remarkably similar to
other examples of peasant protest in pre-colonial South East Asia.17
This link will become more obvious when we later compare it with
protests surrounding the plague.
The Bardez murder occurred on 18 April 1925, when a village mob
killed French tax collector Felix Bardez. The events, in brief, are as
follows. Bardez arrived at the town of Kraan Laev in the morning and
called a village meeting. During the meeting, he tied up three village
notables and refused to release them until the villagers remitted taxes
owed to the colonial government. The villagers, however, simply did
not have the money. Several hours later, while eating his lunch before
the villagers and imprisoned men, Bardez was approached by one of
the imprisoned men’s wives. She offered him a small sum of money to
release her husband temporarily for lunch. Bardez refused. A scuffle
ensued; Bardez’s men were attacked, and he was killed.18 Although it
was widely publicized in Cambodia, in many ways the murder of Felix
Bardez was unexceptional. In other words, the fact that a Frenchman
was the victim is not exceptional. We see numerous references in the
archives, and even occasionally in the colonial newspapers, to the
assassination or murder of Frenchmen by indigenous subordinates. The
method of Bardez’s death is not unusual either. Foreign observers dur-
ing the colonial period often casually mention offending individuals
(pirates, thieves, sorcerers) killed or beaten by a mob.19 What is
exceptional is the combination of the identity of the victim and the
method. That is, the significance of the Bardez death lies in the
combination of a mob killing and a French victim within a very public
setting. There were no other public uprisings during the same period;
the killing was unplanned, and it was not matched by any other tax
protests. On a basic level, the killing was not political in that it was as
much a reaction against the singularly obnoxious and disrespectful
manner in which the man treated the group present as a protest against
what Bardez represented (French colonialism).
17 See, for example, Adas, M. (1981), ‘From avoidance to confrontation: peasant pro-
test in precolonial and colonial Southeast Asia’, Comparative Studies of Society and
History, Vol 23, No 2, pp 217–247.
18 For further details, see Chandler, D. (1982), ‘The assassination of Resident Bardez
(1925): a premonition of revolt in colonial Cambodia’, Journal of the Siam Society,
Vol 70, No 1, pp 35–49.
19 To my knowledge, no studies exist of actual court cases in the French or Khmer
jurisdiction, so it is difficult to assess whether these killings were illegal or
sanctioned by the specific group.
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The attempt to interpret these events as evidence of proto-modern
political consciousness is ultimately unconvincing without an under-
standing of pre-colonial political behaviour. Rather, viewed in historical
context, the 1916 Affair and the Bardez murder seem to represent pre-
colonial social repertoires of contention known to protestors, repertoires
that we will see echoed in many of the responses to public health
measures. Such repertoires are ‘at once a structural and cultural
concept, involving not only what people do when they are engaged in
conflict with others but what they know how to do and what others
expect them to do’.20 Interpreted within the evolutionary trajectory of
Western political traditions, these can appear to be a new sort of
political consciousness. Thus, they seem indicative of rupture or
evolution in political behaviour. However, for South East Asia, these
repertoires seem, in my reading of the evidence, to fall into patterns of
pre-colonial ‘political’ collective action. That is, they seem in many
ways to represent continuity rather than rupture in methods of negotia-
tion between the state and non-state actors. The sense of rupture appears
when these acts are interpreted by the effective state (the colonial
government) and the post-colonial scholar (dependent on colonial
documentation). However, the relationship between modes of protest
and response to the state was dynamic during the colonial era. As what
was ‘expected’ of protestors changed (along with who was interpreting
their actions), protest behaviours and their meanings also changed. These
changes, however, I would place later in the colonial and post-colonial
period, and I would argue that it was a slower process than is suggested
by the scant scholarship available.
Through a history of medical resistance, I will sketch the changing
nature of protest against the colonial state. I will first examine the plague
in the capital city, before looking at more general responses to medical
measures. The many episodes of resistance to French medicine are
presented in such a way as to compare and understand commonalities
and differences in political options within a wide cross section of
indigenous society in Cambodia.
The plague arrives in Cambodia
On 4 June 1907, Phnom Penh Mayor Collard notified Résident Supérieur
20 Tarrow, S. G. (1998), Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Poli-
tics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, p 30 (emphasis in
original).
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Luce of the first bubonic plague death in Cambodian history.21 A
sergeant second class in the French militia, Tran-Van-Xanh, had died
in Phnom Penh two days earlier, his plague-ridden buboes22 confirmed
by microscopic examination in the bacteriology facility recently
installed in the Phnom Penh Hospital. The deceased not only had the
dubious honour of being the first official plague death in the history of
Cambodia, but was also at the forefront of medical history for having
his microscopic killer diagnostically confirmed through laboratory
analysis. His death also coincided, more specifically, with the birth of
the Assistance Médicale in Cambodia.
Since the devastating Hong Kong plague epidemics of the early 1890s,
the colonial government had been trying to prevent the seemingly
inexorable march of the disease from points north and west. Despite
the government’s best efforts, the disease appeared in Annam at the
end of the nineteenth century, ironically linked with the Nha Trang
research laboratory of the Pasteurian Alexandre Yersin, sent proactively
by the French Indo–Chinese government to Hong Kong to study the
disease. In April 1899, Inspector General Kermorgant informed the
regional administrators of suggested measures for the plague epidemics in
Nha Trang and elsewhere: inject the family and those in contact with
the patient with Yersin’s preventative serum; burn all infected homes
in the surrounding perimeter; chemically disinfect the diseased area;
immediately isolate the sick and their family in a lazaret; relocate the
nearby population to a temporary quarantine village; forbid rebuilding
in the affected site for at least a year; make obligatory the declaration
of all plague deaths; and urge all neighbouring villages to turn back
anyone and any materials from a known infected area.23 Kermorgant
understated the situation when noting that some of these measures would
be difficult to implement. Some eight years later, events would prove
that in Cambodia, not only the most draconian, but even comparably
mild measures would be impossible to implement. With the first
21 National Archives of Cambodia, Collection of the Résidence Supérieur du Cambodge
(NAC RSC) 5427.
22 The plague occurs in three forms: bubonic, septicaemic and pulmonary. The disease
manifests itself with fever, chills, headache and extreme exhaustion. Bubonic plague,
the most common form, causes painful and localized swelling in the lymph glands.
These swollen glands are called buboes in English or bubons in French. The most
obvious buboes usual occur in the groin and under the armpits, where the major
lymph nodes of the human body are located. A simple physical examination for the
plague was thus often quite intrusive.
23 NAC RSC 12837.
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Cambodian plague death, the Phnom Penh doctors were exasperated to
find that the sergeant’s entire family had disappeared without a trace
after being ordered to report to the hospital for preventative treatments.
The young Vietnamese soldier was buried under a protective layer of
disinfectant chalk two days after his death, presumably with no family
or friends present.24 This did not bode well for public cooperation with
government health measures.
Following the Nha Trang, Annam, epidemic of 1898, Saigon and
other locations in Vietnam had registered sporadic plague cases and
the occasional minor epidemic into the early twentieth century. The
news of plague in Cambodia in 1907 was unwanted, but the growing
trade and worker migration between Cochin-China and Cambodia had
made the event increasingly likely. Its inevitability did not make its
debut any less alarming. In 1907, Cambodia had four AM doctors, at
this time all French. The training of indigenous médecins had begun
with the opening of the Hanoi Ecole de Médecine in 1902, but as of
1907, none had been posted to Cambodia. The doctors of the AM in
1907 consisted of two physicians at the Mixed Hospital (one of whom,
Hauer, also served as the Cambodian Health Director), a mobile small-
pox vaccinator, and a medical chief stationed in the port town of Kampot.
At the onset of the epidemic, the country’s only medical establishments
were the Phnom Penh Hospital and the military ambulance in Kampot,
although nine new medical posts were planned for the coming year.25
With the onset of the disease, the mobile vaccinator Doctor Lannelongue
was pulled from his smallpox vaccination work in the countryside and
reassigned with a handful of indigenous assistants to patrol the streets
of Phnom Penh and investigate potential cases of the plague.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the metropole had drawn up a
list of 14 diseases whose declaration to the authorities, or dépistage,
was obligatory in the colonies. The French term dépistage entails
disease registration through mandatory declaration of the attending
physician to the authorities.26 In the metropole, the doctor, often in
direct conflict with his vow of professional secrecy, was the uneasy
link between hygienists, legislators, law enforcers and the lay
24 NAC RSC 5427.
25 By medical establishments, I mean any locale devoted predominantly to medical
treatment. Traditional Khmer medicine is practised in the home or the temple, and
has no dedicated establishments per se.
26 Dépistage can also mean, simply, medical screening.
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population. In the colony, dépistage did not work exactly as it worked
in the metropole because the population did not rely upon government-
licensed medical professionals. In the specific context of Cambodia,
the French doctor – who was first of all a military man, colonist, and
administrator – was often the hygienist, legislator and law enforcer.27
Since the indigenous population did not turn to the French doctor for
daily illnesses, he could not be the liaison between the administration
and the general population. His presence was usually an intrusion, hence
dépistage in the colonial context was almost always the forced
examination of the sick by a public health official.28
With French encouragement, King Norodom had abandoned the
ancient Cambodian capital of Oudong in 1866 and relocated 50 kilo-
metres downstream to Phnom Penh, a small town at the confluence of
the Tonle Sap, the Mekong and the Bassac rivers. Phnom Penh in 1907
was a small but growing city. The colonial government was at this time
making a substantial effort to organize the capital of its protectorate
kingdom. In a quarter of a century of control, Phnom Penh had grown
considerably. In an attempt to provide some order, the administration
had earlier partitioned the city into quarters, denoted by both ethnicity
and number. In 1907, the city consisted of four quarters, although in
later years more would be added. The Chinese quarter, the most densely
populated area, was the commercial centre of Phnom Penh. Contempo-
rary photographs and correspondence describe the centre as a place
where occupants lived in often haphazardly built and cramped
quarters, with livestock living among them, garbage and sewage dumped
in the streets and canals, where rats and other stray or unwanted
animals roamed freely. The Cambodian quarter was situated at the
southern end of town. The Royal Palace was to be found here, along
with the dwellings of Cambodian urbanites. The term ‘urbanite’ was
misleading for many of the Khmer in the city, since much of the
Cambodian population was newly urban, and the Khmer population in
this quarter were in some ways simply creating a crowded village on
the outskirts of the Chinese-dominated commerial quarter.
27 By the 1930s, the decreased proportion of military to civilian doctors in the AM also
led to an increase in the invocation of professional secrecy, often to the disgust of the
supervising military doctors. See NAC RSC 2381.
28 For an detailed definition of dépistage and its functioning in Paris, see Barnes, D. S.
(1995), The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis in Nineteenth-Century France,
University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. In the metropolitan context, dépistage
often included coercion and intrusion as well, but to a lesser degree.
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North of the Chinese quarter sat the French quarter. The final quarter,
the Catholic village, was located above the French quarter, at the northern
end of town. Both of these quarters were physically separated from the
indigenous quarters by a canal that encircled them on all sides (see
Figures 1–3). Whether by purposeful French design,29 or by the social
conditions resulting from colonial economic policies,30 the various
ethnicities of the city were, on paper, segregated into relatively
discrete geographical locales, although actual boundaries mixed and
blurred considerably. The government had attempted to improve
canals, build sewers, standardize building codes, mandate weekly clean-
ing of the open-air markets, and regulate various other behaviours of
Asian subject populations, mainly under the banner of improving
public hygiene, and most often roundly ignored by city inhabitants.
The majority of the city’s population was not Khmer. A rough census
in 1909 estimated nearly 50,000 inhabitants, with approximately 16,000
Chinese and 11,000 Vietnamese. The French population still numbered
under 1,000.31
In the initial stages of the epidemic, the plague deaths were concen-
trated in the Chinese quarter. The authorities implemented measures in
a scattershot manner. The municipal doctor examined the suspected
dead, usually extracting a sample of the bubo or liver. Some huts were
burned; the afflicted were transported to a hastily constructed new
lazaret; family members and neighbours were coerced into submitting
to the rather painful Yersin serum for the plague. This shot was not
only painful, but also produced some plague symptoms, including body
aches and high fever. Further, its success rate in preventing or curing
the plague proved to be low. In 1907, the serum was used on every
plague patient at the lazaret, and the mortality rate was still a stagger-
ing 97%. Understandably, townsfolk deeply distrusted the purpose of
this serum. The colonial government, rather than questioning the
efficacy of the treatment, blamed this distrust on superstition. Health
Director Hauer explained:
The preventative use of the Yersin serum was very rarely accepted by those
having cohabited with plague victims, because of an interesting story that makes
29 See Edwards, P. (1999), ‘Cambodge: the cultivation of a nation’, PhD thesis, History
Department, Monash University, Melbourne.
30 See Furnivall, J. S. (1956), Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of
Burma and Netherlands India, New York University Press, New York.
31 NAC RSC 709.
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Figure 1. Phnom Penh circa 1910, from NAC File 9315, schematized by the author.
Courtesy of the NAC.
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Figure 2. View of Phnom Penh riverfront looking north from the Khmer quarter, circa
1900. The spire in the distance is Wat Phnom, located in the centre of the French
quarter.
Courtesy of the NAC.
Figure 3. The Phnom Penh market in the Chinese quarter, circa 1892.
Courtesy of the AIP.
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the medication take on a barbaric aspect. It is said that French doctors are open-
ing the stomachs of subjects to take their liver, etc...etc...The cohabitants, wrongly
informed by malicious people, fled to the countryside as soon as they under-
stood that defensive measures were to be employed.32
This rumour has precedents in Khmer folklore. In the mid-nineteenth
century, stories circulated in the countryside of particularly daring and
vicious marauders murdering villagers and stealing their livers. Elephants
washed or sprayed with a mixture of alcohol and human liver were
supposedly rendered invincible in war.33 In contemporary Cambodian
folklore, ‘oil’ ritually extracted from female cadavers on the third day
after death has powerful magical properties.34 The indigenous popula-
tion, having no experience of government interference with corpses,
may have interpreted this manipulation of its dead as in some way linked
to other instances of interference with the dead. However, they must
also have considered the nonexistent therapeutic value of the painful
French injection. Khmers did not willingly give up their sick to dépistage
and, forbidden to leave the city, many city dwellers fled under the cover
of night into the surrounding forests. Nevertheless, for the better part
of a month, the panic seemed relatively controlled.
The ‘ridiculous’ pig incinerations
The situation changed on 7 July 1907. On that date, Municipal Doctor
Lannelongue discovered the first plague death in the Cambodian
quarter, at Boeung (Lake) Pechou. He ordered the immediate incinera-
tion of the victim’s straw hut, under which he found three pigs living.
He brought the matter to the attention of Mayor Collard, who hastily
ordered all the pigs in the area to be slaughtered. In a short time, nearly
100 pigs were confiscated and incinerated. The added threat to live-
stock seemed to have a considerable terrorizing effect, for the flight of
city occupants also increased, presumably with their threatened live-
stock and livelihoods. At the height of the exodus, the authorities
estimated that as many as 5,000 Cambodians, or a tenth of the
population, fled the city in a single day. Those who did not flee were
stirred to further action. As incomprehensible as most of the previous
32 NAC RSC 12624; AM Annual Report, 1907.
33 Pannetier, D. A. (1983), Au coeur du pays khmer: Notes cambodgiennes, CEDORECK,
Paris, p 29.
34 Choulean, A. (1986), Les êtres surnaturels dans la religion populaire khmère,
CEDORECK, Paris, p 135.
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measures had seemed, they had not provoked widespread public
disorder. However, the seemingly arbitrary and destructive nature of
this measure provoked a spontaneous public outcry. An angry mob soon
gathered in protest. However, just as would happen with the 1916
Affair, the mob gathered before the Royal Palace, not the Résidence
Supérieur du Cambodge (French colonial government headquarters).35
This measure was incomprehensible not only to Khmers. Public health
experts by 1907 had discovered the aetiological pathway of the plague;
it was spread by flea bites among human and rat hosts.36 No aetiologi-
cal link existed between the disease and pigs. The Mayor had consulted
neither the Cambodian Résident Supérieur (RSC) nor the Health
Director before killing the pigs, and both men were puzzled by his
reasoning. In his annual medical report to the Inspector General, Health
Director Hauer described this measure as ‘untimely’ and some time
later would refer to the incident as the ‘ridiculous business of inciner-
ated pigs’.37 In defence of his actions, Mayor Collard wrote on 10 July:
[i]f they [the pigs] had absorbed the feces or other contaminated materials fallen
from this hut, they would be propagating agents of this evil, either in their waste,
or through their consumption [by humans].... Pigs being free to roam in this part
of the town, [and] these pigs having surely mixed with the others, I recalled the
musings of M. le Gouverneur Général who regretted that, in Saigon, there was
some timidity at the debut of the epidemic, I adopted a radical measure; I
ordained the slaughter of these animals and their incineration.38
This justification is not illogical; however, it did not mesh with the
current knowledge of the disease. Although 10 years earlier, the specu-
lations of prominent scientists on plague aetiology had not been far
from the Mayor’s, laboratory-verified information in those few inter-
vening years had made Collard’s reasoning seem ignorant.39 Also, while
35 NAC RSC 12624.
36 Paul Louis Simond, one of the early Pasteurians in Indo-China, is credited with what
are now seen as classic biological experiments linking the plague to flea bites. Pub-
lished in 1898, his findings were at first roundly criticized. However, by the early
twentieth century, fellow researchers had accepted his hypothesis.
37
‘Une ridicule histoire de porcs incinérés’, NAC RSC 12624.
38 NAC RSC 32226. Letter from Mayor Collard to RSC on 10 July 1907. The Mayor
claimed that he had instructed the health staff to keep a list of pig owners to indem-
nify; he had even intended to allow the owners themselves to set the pig values. It
seems doubtful, with the haste of the killings and the confusion that ensued, that
these orders had been followed.
39 For example, plague researcher Alexandre Yersin speculated that the plague germ
was spread by ants, flies, or even spores within the ground.
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claiming the need for ‘radical measures’ and bold decisions in the Khmer
quarter, the Mayor (with Municipal Doctor Lannelongue) had refused
to cooperate with Health Director Hauer in concerted city-wide public
health measures because he feared an uprising among the 16,000
Chinese and any subsequent blow to the economy.40 The Chinese, who
made up most of the merchant class of the city, held considerable
economic clout. The contrast in forcefulness was also in part due to the
presumed meekness of the Khmer race, a common theme in French
colonial perceptions.
Having disturbed much of the city, the Mayor was at a loss as to how
to restore public order. The RSC stepped in and requested the aid of the
Khmer elite in calming the crowd. To the annoyance of the Mayor, the
princes assigned to the task went before the crowds, and rather than
calming them, ‘on the contrary excited them further with their xeno-
phobic speeches’.41 A few days after the pig killings, King Sisowath
visited the Mayor in an effort to bring peace to the city. He agreed to be
vaccinated in exchange for the withdrawal of French medical authori-
ties from the Khmer quarter. Since only two cases of plague had been
discovered in the quarter, and other attempts to calm the crowds were
ineffective as the week passed, the French authorities acquiesced. The
RSC decreed that should another case be confirmed in the Khmer
quarter, no individual measures would be undertaken and the entire
quarter would be quarantined en masse. The King, Khmer officials and
the French mayor made the announcement to the crowd gathered
before the Banh Yong pavilion. According to Collard,
This crowd cheered with joy and thus emboldened, declared that they didn’t
want their private lives and illnesses interfered with. Particularly agitated, one
group of women had at its head a woman who gesticulated more than the others
and screamed her head off ‘à tue-tête’ that Cambodians did not want to listen to
the talk of French doctors, in whom they had no confidence. The Minister of
War told me that this woman was a midwife. It is possible to think that she
undoubtedly anticipated competition with the Maternity that is to open in a few
days.42
40 As in many South East Asian nations, the Chinese diaspora constituted the backbone
of the merchant class. For a history of the Chinese diaspora in Cambodia, see Wilmott,
W. E. (1967), The Chinese in Cambodia, University of British Columbia Publica-
tions, Vancouver.
41 NAC RSC 12624.
42 NAC RSC 32225. Letter from Mayor Collard to RSC on 19 July 1907. It is also
telling that the woman was a traditional midwife, and as such, one of the groups
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This description is enlightening not only with regard to the state of the
Khmer population during this crisis, but also for its description of the
active involvement of women in the protests. Although objection to
access to a woman’s body was common, this is a rare description of
women openly participating in a formal protest.
After this announcement, the authorities exempted the Khmer
population from most public health measures. Other ethnic groups, how-
ever, also had distinct grievances against the epidemic regulations. The
Chinese congregation lodged protests about the extended closing of
buildings and the transfer of the sick to the lazarets, as well as trouble-
some disinfection measures such as fumigation by sulphurous gas and
whitewashing. Using their commercial clout, the ‘Celestes’, as they
were whimsically referred to by the administration, obtained a major
concession from the medical administration when it allowed them in
1907 to open a Chinese hospital.
By the end of the summer, the plague seemed to have run its course;
the last official death of the year occurred on 30 September 1907. The
city registered 87 confirmed cases, with 83 deaths. The Health
Director divided them ethnically into 78 Chinese, three Khmer, five
Vietnamese and two ‘other Asiatics’. Undoubtedly, more than three
Khmers had died of the plague; the surprisingly low number of Khmer
victims was most likely due to the lack of medical surveillance in their
quarter. But, even taking into account the many dissimulations and hidden
deaths among town inhabitants, the death toll was still much lower
than the authorities had feared. But although the numbers were
relatively small, the impact of this first plague epidemic on the
organization of the city’s health services was considerable.
Towards the end of the first epidemic, when Doctor Lannelongue
was to resume his mobile vaccination runs in the countryside, Mayor
Collard argued the need for a permanent municipal doctor, and specifi-
cally for the retention of Lannelongue in this role.43 Although Collard
seemed to have won the general point, as the AM and RSC decided to
fund a permanent municipal doctor, Lannelongue’s advice (or lack of
advice) in the events leading up to the pig killings appears to have led
to his return to the provinces. 1908 found him posted as Medical
whose survival seemed, at this early juncture in the development of the AM, depend-
ent on the failure of French medicine. The AM was soon to open a maternity unit in
the Mixed Hospital for indigenous women. Her worry over competition would prove
unfounded.
43 NAC RSC 11611.
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Chief in the nearby, newly created medical district of Kandal. Mayor
Collard was also removed from his post. Thus the year after the plague’s
debut, the city had a temporary new mayor (the renowned colonial
scholar Adhemard Leclère) and a new municipal doctor, Devy. Devy,
freshly reassigned from the naval service, was presumably better versed
either in the newer developments in medicine or in following the chain
of medical command. Meanwhile, the Health Director had met the RSC
to clarify the role of the municipality and the medical service. They
established that the Health Director had primacy in all matters relating
to epidemic control; the Mayor was to cooperate with him in sanitary
regulations and consult with him before changes in or additions to
public health measures. An occurrence such as ‘the ridiculous pig
incinerations’ would not happen again. Further, the newly created
municipality had in place a quantity of Yersin’s serum,
established procedures for dealing with the disease, and a new brigade
of indigenous police dedicated solely to investigating and reporting
suspected illnesses. The administration seemed better prepared for
future epidemics.
Pestilence redux
The following year, a monk on the Chruy Changvar peninsula, an area
to the north-east of the city across the Sap River, was confirmed as a
plague victim. The Health Director asked the King to intervene to
encourage fellow monks to be vaccinated. When the royal court
showed hesitation in taking this active role, Hauer approached the
achaar44 of the wat, and with his cooperation organized the vaccination of
eight fellow monks in the wat. Only one monk refused the serum and
died of the plague shortly thereafter, while no reported cases appeared
among the vaccinated. Whether this batch of serum held some
preventative properties or these seven monks were merely fortunate
was uncertain. This soon became a moot point, as the vaccine quickly
fell into short supply, and became reserved as a prophylactic for the
sick. The administration raised the bounty for dead rats, from four
cents a head at the beginning of the epidemic to 10 cents a head at its
height.
At the behest of the RSC, the Khmer Council of Ministers distrib-
uted a poster publicizing the dangers of the plague to the Khmer
population. A disease new to Cambodia, it was transliterated in the
Khmer alphabet, as ‘La Peh’ (in French ‘la peste’, ), as was the
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word ‘serum’ 45 The original draft of the poster submitted by
the Council for French approval referred to the disease as ‘rook peh’
 and emphasized the need for doctor’s visits and disclosure
to public health officials.46 However, the final version had significant
changes. The announcement distributed in the Khmer quarter was similar
to the French, Chinese and Vietnamese posters, with one notable
exception: it did not mention dépistage.47 In addition, all members of
the household and neighbours were to be vaccinated with ‘serum’.
‘Serum’, incidentally, was neither translated nor explained in the
announcement. Neither did it mention lazarets or mandatory acts or
fines of any sort, although it did note that straw huts in which the
disease was found should be burned. Overall, it served as a relatively
mild, prescriptive document.48 Despite this attempt at public
dissemination of necessary information, once again confusion ensued,
and once again city inhabitants made for the forests under the cover of
night. Authorities blamed unidentified rumours as nearly 10,000 city
dwellers fled into the countryside.
Plague in the palace
This second year of the plague, unlike the first, would significantly
impact on the royal court. The tension was already high when one
inopportune death triggered massive disorder. A favoured concubine
of Prince Duong Mathura, Lady Preng, died suddenly and mysteri-
ously on 8 April 1908.49 Duong Mathura was a particularly high-ranking
prince, favoured son of King Sisowath, and considered the most likely
candidate to be named obbareach (heir apparent).50 On the morning of
44 The achaar is the lay ritual officiant of a Buddhist monastery.
45 NAC RSC 26705.
46 NAC RSC 2140.
47 Rather, the document urged inhabitants to avoid rats, which were the agents of the
plague; to avoid the dejections and sputum of the sick; to keep surrounding areas
scrupulously clean to discourage rats; and to disinfect the land around the house as
well as all belongings of the sick and anyone who cared for the sick with ‘alcohol,
whitewash or other killing agent’ .
48 NAC RSC 26705.
49 In some French documents, Lady Preng is wrongly identified as Mathura’s aunt or
his mother. This stems from one incorrect translation of a letter from the Council of
Ministers on the subject.
50 Khmer kingship is not determined by rules of primogeniture. The reigning king des-
ignates his preferred heir, the obbareach. At the king’s death, his wishes are taken
into account, but the new king is determined by the Council of Ministers.
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Lady Preng’s death, Municipal Doctor Devy came to the palace grounds
to examine her body. He and his team were refused entrance to her
small home in the royal quarter. Devy left, and returned shortly after at
10 am with a Khmer mandarin. He was met by the sister of Duong
Mathura, Princess Somphady, who again turned them away, claiming
that the deceased was sealed in a coffin and Khmer rites forbade its
reopening. She insisted that the deceased had died of dysentery. In this
meeting, the French doctor found her to be ‘aggressive, violent, and
insolent’.51 After this second rebuff, Mayor Leclère, at Devy’s request,
personally requested an audience with King Sisowath at 3 and at 5 pm
that day to obtain his intercession with his recalcitrant son; both times
he was told that the King was napping. The King was able to grant the
Mayor an audience later that evening, after the scheduled hour of Lady
Preng’s cremation. Unable to prevent her cremation, the health
services then decided, as was standard with a suspected death, to order
the quarantine of the house for several days. Despite these specific
orders, French authorities were exasperated to learn the following morn-
ing that approximately 50 people were congregating in the deceased’s
home. Leclère and Devy quickly convened at the house, where they
found five monks performing ceremonial death rites for Lady Preng in
front of a crowd of mourners. Not to be deterred by this ‘new bravado’,
the doctor and the Mayor chased all the mourners out mid-ceremony,
and ordered the building’s immediate incineration. Bystanders seemed
both amused and appalled by this administrative daring. The Mayor, in
justifying the incident, argued:
It is necessary that the palace residents and the mandarins understand that our
authority is superior to theirs, the same in fact for health measures, that the great
as well as the small must adhere to the regulations in place for everyone and that
individual resistance, no matter from whom, will be punished.52
The Council of Ministers defended the actions of the mourners,
informing the RSC that the funeral ceremony was a Khmer tradition
that had to be performed in the home of the deceased.
Nine days later, on 18 April, a large protest of nearly 1,500 city
dwellers erupted, once again in front of the palace, a mob that the
administrators were certain was orchestrated by local notables.
51 NAC RSC 2140. Letter from Mayor to RSC Luce on 10 April 1908.
52 Ibid.
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This rowdy crowd claimed that the French doctor was taking the bodies to see
the genitalia of the women, on whom they then wanted to have experiments
[experiences], attempt fantastic operations. Threats were made, if the king could
not aid them then the people were going to resist by force, to oppose the coming
of the doctor and the disinfectors – The King demanded time to examine the
situation; he requested the Résident Supérieur’s participation in a meeting 3
days later, until which time the same turmoil reigned. The local chief attempted
to reason with these agitated men, but in vain. In the presence of this state of
spirits, the protestors declared that they would sooner prefer to die than to
follow our methods, [and] the Résident Supérieur then granted them what they
demanded, to no longer concern ourselves with them.53
The violence reached its peak on 21 and 22 April, and once again, the
colonial government decided it prudent to back down on plague
measures. However, the wrath of Duong Mathura was apparently not
spent, if he had indeed orchestrated the demonstrations. On 20 April,
Duong Mathura had sent a letter to the Khmer Ministry of the Interior
requesting an indemnity of 114 piastres for his torched property, Lady
Preng’s home. This request eventually reached Mayor Leclère.54 On 2
May, Leclère sent a strongly worded letter of refusal, pointing out that
reimbursement for destroyed property was not required by decree, but
if made was simply an act of administrative magnanimity for the sake
of an indigent population. The prince was neither indigent nor, in the
opinion of the Mayor, deserving of magnanimity. Rather, the Mayor
accused him of inciting trouble and fraudulently inflating the value of
the house. The refusal was a major slight, particularly considering that
the administration had approved every other indemnity request that
year.55 To add insult to injury, Leclère requested that the King and the
Khmer Council of Ministers should bring punitive measures against
Duong Mathura and Somphady.56 Perhaps the RSC thought it was
prudent simply to let the matter lie, for no record exists that he
requested formal punishment or reprimand for the royal siblings. It may
53 NAC RSC 2486. AM Annual Report 1908. Cambodian Health Director Hauer.
54 Indemnities for destruction of property were paid out of the municipal budget, over
which the mayor presided.
55 A second high-ranking functionary, Khun Pheakdeay Reachea Pen, was granted a
relatively small indemnity. He found his house burning when he returned from the
funeral of his 8-year-old daughter. At the writing of his request, in early April, his
wife had also fallen ill. He requested 84 piastres from the administration and was
reimbursed the much more modest sum of 40 piastres.
56 NAC RSC 2140. Letters by Duong Mathura, Council of Ministers, RSC, and Cam-
bodian Health Director.
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have been that by this date, the prince had fallen ill. A few days after
the Mayor refused the indemnity, informants advised the Central
Commissioner of Police that the prince’s faction had publicized that he
would pay 200 piastres for the head of any doctor found meddling with
the plague. The administration, strangely, took no official action against
this brazen defiance. Rather, the health services were paralysed for
almost a month, and the number of plague deaths continued to mount.57
This year, in contrast to the previous year, many of the victims were
among the Khmer elite.
After several weeks, with no end to the epidemic in sight, some of
the Khmer elite began to request plague measures. Prince Duong
Mathura’s death at some point during the month (an unconfirmed case
of the plague recorded with some smugness by Health Director Hauer)
came as an emotional blow to King Sisowath. It was an advantageous
death for the French; after his favoured son’s death, the King became
much more amenable to colonial public health measures. Whether this
was due to the loss of the prince’s anti-French influence on his father,
or whether his death was a cautionary lesson for the King, following
Duong Mathura’s demise, the King decided that some public health
measures were necessary. However, he urged the administration to move
slowly and with care, because, as he explained, the Khmer population
did not understand the danger of the disease or the necessity for these
sanitary regulations. The health services resumed tentatively, with the
final say on any measures in the Khmer quarter being given by King
Sisowath. Examination of the deceased was now done with a Khmer
delegate of the Ministry of the Interior present, and the destruction of
huts permitted only after the recommendation of a mandarin. The Health
Director noted the absolute need to get the notables on side if the
administration wanted an effective collaboration ‘for the sake of the
people’.58 Genuine cooperation by the elite, he would discover, was an
elusive proposition.
Sensitivity and the military man
While they were carefully negotiating the issue of medical authority
over plague measures, the colonial authorities were less hesitant in
exercising their punitive authority against the unrest of April. The RSC
57 NAC RSC 2140.
58 NAC RSC 2486.
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demanded that the Council of Ministers undertake an investigation of
the mobs and rioting and bring any ringleaders to trial. In mid-May, the
Council submitted its findings to the French administration. The report
claimed that the lack of precise information precluded the ability to
name any wrongdoers. From the 1,500 protestors, its investigators could
locate only two complainants, who accused Dr Devy of stripping their
dead wives, looking at the women’s private parts, and shaving the
pubic hair of one. The Council’s report describes the complaint of one
group:
Neang Sam, who lived with the Service of Elephants, died this past March 26 of
asthma…They, the named Prom and Chek, were preparing the body for the
funeral rites, when a doctor came to view the deceased. He lifted the cloth
covering the corpse, which thus revealed her breasts and ordered them to
remove the skirt that she wore, leaving her thus completely nude. The doctor
made, in her left hip with the aid of an instrument, a prick about two fingers
deep, and he ordered the removal and burning of the huts situated in front of the
house, without providing the slightest indemnity.59
The plain language of the report took as fact the woman’s death from
asthma. Although this may have been an attempt to make the health
services’ presence seem more inappropriate, it is just as likely that the
authors could not contemplate a link between the cause of death and
the examination of the body in this manner. Further, neutral though the
language of the report seemed, the graphic nature of the description
also reveals the disrespect perceived from the incident. This short
description also illustrates that the municipality did not inform injured
parties that indemnities were not provided automatically, but rather
had to be requested from the municipal government.
On reading the Council’s report, the Mayor was for the most part
unsatisfied. He believed that the complaints of disrespect made against
the doctor were probably exaggerated. He did suggest that some com-
plaints perhaps ‘weren’t totally unfounded’, because ‘military doctors,
accustomed solely to treating men, don’t always show as much
discretion as a civilian doctor’.60 He also noted that, well before he
was a mayor, a city doctor had commented to him that the native popu-
lation had the most violent repugnance at seeing doctors uncovering
the private parts of their wives and daughters. When the Mayor dis-
cussed the complaints with Devy, including the accusation that the
59 NAC RSC 2140. Letter from Council of Ministers to RSC, 18 May 1908.
60 NAC RSC 2140. Letter from Mayor Leclère to RSC, 25 May 1908.
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doctors only wanted to see the genitalia of native women, the doctor
dismissed these arguments with a smile. The Mayor, in a private letter
to the RSC, wrote that he would have ‘preferred explanations to this
smile’ along with ‘an absolute denial’, but that he was certain that for
the most part Devy was acting judiciously. As a solution, Leclère asked
the interpreter to ‘invite’ family members to tie a ‘well-woven’ scarf
around the pubic area of their dead and sick women, between and around
the thighs (essentially making makeshift underwear) to allay any
suspicions. As to the investigation of the Khmer malfeasants, he
accused the entire council of making little effort to find and punish the
responsible parties. This seems to be a reasonable accusation, consid-
ering the paucity of information obtained from the 100 interviews Khmer
investigators claimed to have conducted.
Collaboration and dissimulation
Indeed, the Mayor had reason to be doubtful about the zealousness of
the Council. The Head of the Council of Ministers was the Minister of
the Interior (Akkamohasêna), Col de Monteiro. The Monteiro family
was one of an elite group of Khmer–Portuguese Catholics. Descended
from a number of Portuguese adventurers who had settled in Cambo-
dia in the seventeenth century and intermarried with the local population,
this Khmer métis group rose to prominence in the Khmer court with
the arrival of the French. Their liminal position as being tenuously
European, as well as their abilities as translators and businessmen,
allowed them to serve as an important bridge between French and Khmer
cultures.61 Col de Monteiro, who in 1860 began as a clerk and
translator for Norodom, had amassed enough power and fortune by 1908
to be considered by colonial observers richer and more influential than
the King.62
On 31 May, Devy was called to register three plague deaths at Col de
Monteiro’s property in the Catholic village. At least one of the victims
had been sick for nearly four days, and all had had recourse to a kru
khmer before notifying Devy. 63 The doctor was ‘astonished’, since
Col de Monteiro continually positioned himself as a European and a
staunch French collaborator vis à vis the Khmer population. He also
61 For more information, see Müller, G. (2002), ‘Visions of grandeur, tales of failure’,
PhD thesis, Chapter 3, History Department, University of Zurich, Switzerland.
62 Pannetier, supra note 33, at p 33.
63 A kru khmer is an traditional Khmer doctor.
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served as the liaison in public health and many other matters between
the Khmer and the French administration. Further, Col de Monteiro
had volunteered his personal deputy, Oknya Yothea Norin, when the
medical services requested a high-ranking official to accompany the
Municipal Doctor on his investigative rounds. 64 Although only one of
the deceased was positively identified at the time as a family member
(his granddaughter), Col de Monteiro later revealed that the other two
victims were his wife and a son. Although one of over half a dozen
wives, this one, Salio, was likely to have been his primary wife.65
A month earlier, the Council of Ministers had sent RSC Luce a
request for a 100-piastre indemnity for Col de Monteiro’s deputy, in
part for the money he had advanced to informants who had helped him
in his plague surveillance work, but also as financial compensation for
the hatred and rancour the oknya had endured while accompanying the
French doctor. In discussion with the Mayor and the Municipal Doctor,
the RSC decided that Yothea Norin was far from deserving a reward,
especially in view of his failure to comply with the public health laws
when the plague had afflicted his own family. Remarkably, while the
oknya was ferreting out other sick individuals for the municipal
authorities, he hid his own wife’s affliction from the municipal doctor
for three days and also had her treated by a kru khmer before taking her
to the French hospital, where she subsequently died of the plague. By
June, the Mayor, in a state of high frustration at what he saw as unend-
ing dissimulation and faithlessness from the Khmer quarter, once again
demanded through the Council of Ministers that Col de Monteiro and
his deputy be punished ‘tam banda sak’ – according to their rank. Upon
learning of the charge, Col de Monteiro protested to the RSC that he
was the greatest advocate of French medicine, having in the past been
treated by Dr Hauer numerous times for vertigo. He himself believed
in the superiority of French over traditional medicine. The choices made
by those around him, he claimed, were completely out of his control:
For the inhabitants of the Catholic village, including those who are either my
children or my grandchildren, or my relatives, if they refuse treatment by French
doctors, it is because they have their own native doctors whom they have been
accustomed to trusting from birth, and it is because they don’t yet have
64 An oknya is a very high-ranking mandarin or nobleman; the title is usually conferred
by the king.
65 Col had seven other wives who shared a mansion in the city. Salio had the privilege
of being the sole matriarch of his home in the Catholic quarter.
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confidence in French medicine. It is not possible for me to force them to be
treated by French doctors, considering that the King, the Council of Ministers
and you [the RSC], in common accord, have decided not to force anyone.66
The Mayor pointed out that Col de Monteiro’s statements of his own
innocence were contrary to known information – that Col had requested
Khmer doctors to treat his sick family members and he neither called
nor encouraged the French doctors to come to the Catholic quarter
during the several days his family members were sick – and that he
should therefore be punished severely. The RSC gave the order to the
Council, but no record exists of punishment meted out to either Col or
his deputy. In Col de Monteiro’s case, it was unnecessary. Six months
later, in November 1908, he too died.67
Although these men were native political elite, the recalcitrance of
Duong Mathura, Col de Monteiro and Yothea Norin must be seen as
more than acts of political confrontation. While their mothers, wives
and children died around them, these men were trying to make the best
choices to protect themselves and their loved ones. It is doubtful whether,
even if they had fully cooperated with the colonial health measures,
they would have escaped the disease. It is almost certain that their loved
ones, already sick with the plague, would have died under either tradi-
tional or AM medical care. It seems reasonable to assume that if the
AM therapeutics did convincingly save lives, these men would have
willingly employed them, despite their ‘colonial’ taint. Duong Mathura
and Col de Monteiro did not simply die for their politics; nor did they
die because of their beliefs.
The epidemic gradually declined in 1908 without actually ending.
By the end of the year, 253 deaths had been recorded, with almost a
100% mortality rate.68 In 1909, the health services recorded 142 plague
deaths. The disease had become by its third year more endemic than
epidemic. For the next five years, the number of annual plague deaths
would rise steadily. The death rate would not drop until 1914, when
305 recorded deaths represented a slight decrease from 327 in 1913.
66 NAC RSC 2140. Letter from Col to RSC, 9 June 1908.
67 The cause of his death is unrecorded. This is despite the mass of archival records
created by his death, as his numerous children squabbled in the courts over his amassed
wealth.
68 Mortality rates were probably inflated because the rare plague victims who actually
recovered were likely never to have been seen or recorded by the authorities. The
French were usually notified of only the direst cases; and in most cases, only made a
confirmed diagnosis when investigating a death.
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Most deaths occurred in the latter third of the year.69 Ironically, the
decrease in deaths coincided with another peak in plague controver-
sies. Although friction with the population was most serious at the height
of this epidemic, tension had already increased between the French
and Khmer administrations over a few cases in the royal quarter early
in the year.
The prerogative of elites
On 30 January 1914, informants revealed to the French Dr Bonnigal
that Prince Phat Saweth had allegedly taken or kidnapped a seriously
ill 14-year-old house servant named Chau Lak (Liep). Witnesses
reported that the Prince had boasted of having magical royal healing
powers for the plague and planned to demonstrate these powers on the
adolescent.70 After Liep died in his care, the Prince ordered the boy’s
body to be returned to his parents, and promptly disappeared. Phat
Saweth’s whereabouts in the 10 days following Liep’s death were
unknown. During this time, neither he nor any of his family had sub-
mitted to the plague serum. To complicate the situation further, one of
Phat’s neighbours had died of the plague on 29 January.
The Municipal Doctor considered Phat Saweth’s discovery and
detention an urgent matter, not only to bring action against him, but
also to prevent further spread of the plague and any further attempts to
use his claimed healing powers. To this end, the RSC sent a note to
King Sisowath urging him to find and admonish his son, and to order
him to ‘abstain from practices that are a danger to public health’.71 On
13 February, in an attempt to exonerate his son, Sisowath forwarded to
the RSC a letter written by Phat Saweth. In his letter of 11 February
addressed to the King, the Prince claimed that he was innocent of the
accusations.72 The Prince protested that he had known nothing of the
69 NAC RSC 1561.
70 The healing power of Khmer kings, like European kings, is a common myth. See
Mak, P. (1995), Histoire du Cambodge: De la fin du XVIe siêcle au debut du XVIIIe,
Presses de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, Paris. Phat Saweth is a prince, not a
king – a very important distinction. We may speculate that this kidnapping was re-
lated to a desire on his part to prove his kingliness.
71 NAC RSC 12622.
72 Rather, he had borrowed a royal elephant from Prince Duong Leakhena and taken it
up to his plantation at Prey Prasat without knowing anything of the plague or any
deaths in his house. He argued from this that he could not possibly have boasted
about healing plague victims; nor could he have killed anyone. Further, the
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disease until he had returned to find his house fumigated and quaran-
tined. Thus the RSC was mistaken and he was innocent.73 Once again,
and much to the frustration of French juridical sensibilities, this state-
ment seemed to contradict the known facts. Indeed, the excuses in his
letter were flimsy at best; he offered no witnesses to counter accusing
witnesses; and his account of dates and locations was vague. But, as
before, no written record exists of any punishment against the Prince,
and it is doubtful whether the matter went any further.
On 19 May, Prince Chanta Leakhena approached Bonnigal with
another complaint involving the maltreatment of a servant. The Prince
informed the doctor that a palace servant girl named Kaouc had fallen
ill with the plague, and had been carried under his orders to the gun-
powder room outside of the palace grounds. The young girl, an attendant
to Lady Moniang Molias, was moved into the gunpowder room
because she was ‘not of a class’ that was permitted to die on palace
grounds. Although the Prince would have preferred to send her to the
public lazaret, the Minister of the Palace, Thiounn, directed him to
send the girl to the arsenal. Seeing that she was essentially imprisoned
without care, the Prince had requested that Thiounn provide her with
some medical attention. When Thiounn failed to respond to his request,
Leakhena decided to take the matter to an outside authority, and
approached Bonnigal.
When questioned by the RSC, Thiounn affirmed that the servant had
been sent to the gunpowder room, since it had been allocated as a plague
isolation room for the serving women of the Palace. Claiming
ignorance of her three days of neglectful imprisonment, Thiounn added
that he had transferred Kaouc to the public lazaret soon after her condi-
tion had been brought to his attention. He also argued that the King had
never given permission for palace family or staff to be sent to the
public lazaret. As a further defence, he pointed out that all Khmer sick
with the plague, whether inside or outside the Palace, hid their sick-
nesses until death or dépistage for fear of isolation in the lazaret or
inoculation with the plague serum. Presumably Kaouc, had she been
household servant had gone of his own volition to die in the house of Phat Saweth’s
mother. He further disputed basic information about the dead child, including his
name, which he insisted was actually Krahom (‘Red’, which is most likely a nick-
name) and his age (he believed he was five years old).
73 NAC RSC 12622.
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conscious, would have preferred the treatment she received to the treat-
ment the French would have offered her.74
Thiounn requested that the RSC should have the king clarify the
procedure for the isolation of palace staff for any future illnesses.
After the French colonial government received this explanation, it did
not have enough grounds to censure the Minister. The explanation, how-
ever, did reveal Kaouc’s palace employer. Bonnigal therefore scheduled
a vaccination meeting at the home of Moniang Malias. To his irritation, he
found on his arrival that all the adult women had left the residence, and
another servant who had contracted the plague had been sent away to
an unknown location. In frustration, Bonnigal urged the RSC to block
the entire palace area from all public interactions – essentially to
quarantine the royal grounds – since, as he saw it, the royal family
continued to take gross risks with public health. Such a suggestion was
of course impractical, considering that the members of the royal family
were still important public figures, even if in actuality they did little
governing. It is also important to note that not only royalty, but also
Frenchmen resisted the public health measures of the administration.
A few months after these deaths, a Mr Eychene, whose next-door
neighbour had died of the plague, refused vaccination. He did not
accede to vaccination until RSC Luce threatened to place him and his
family by force in the public lazaret for eight to nine days. The ability
to dissimulate also did not belong exclusively to the colonized. In
accepting the vaccination, Eychene claimed that his previous refusal
to be vaccinated had simply been a protest at the hygiene service’s
long delay in executing prophylactic measures at his neighbour’s
house.75
As these episodes reveal, while French medical officials coerced the
colonial population into unwanted medical measures, the Khmer elite
also imposed unwanted medical measures upon their servant populations.
The Prince’s inexpert ‘laying on of hands’ may have outraged the
doctor, but certainly no more than the bureaucratic authority of the doctor
outraged the elite. Concern for their servants may have impelled
Dr Bonnigal’s informants to obtain French intercession, but they were
also motivated by internal rivalries. For example, Thiounn, as Minister
of the Palace, was one of the five members of the Khmer Council of
74 Although no historical record exists of her fate, Kaouc most likely died at the public
lazaret.
75 NAC RSC 11614. Letters from Bonnigal, RSC and Eychene.
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Figure 4. Monivong (left) and Thiounn, circa 1920.
Courtesy of the NAC.
Ministers who determined the succession of the next king (see Figure
4).76 Prince Duong Leakhena, a potential heir to the throne who was
not on the best of terms with Thiounn, would have benefited from
Thiounn’s disgrace. Thiounn cleverly exploited the lack of regulatory
clarity to extricate himself from responsibility. Within intra-elite
politics, the colonial doctor and his regulations could serve as a tool
used by one faction against another.
76 This statement must be qualified for much of the colonial period, as in actuality the
Council of Ministers rubber-stamped the French colonial government’s choice of
succession.
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Crossed dialogues
Elite resistance to plague measures was also due to simple misunder-
standings exacerbated by mistrust. In early February, Princess Pathoma,
who lived next to a house contaminated with plague, refused to be
vaccinated or examined by the French doctor. When her husband died
of plague shortly after, she fled to her own residence. The RSC sent a
request to Thiounn to arrange a consultation for Bonnigal with Pathoma.
The Minister of the Palace approached her with his demand, but she
refused to acquiesce. Thiounn dropped the matter, explaining to the
RSC that because she was very sick, he could not force her to see the
doctor. The very reason the doctor wanted to see the princess was the
reason proffered to excuse her from his visit. The princess in her inter-
view with Thiounn explained that both she and her Khmer doctor
concurred that her ailment was not the plague: rather, she was suffer-
ing from a long-term recurrent vertigo that prevented her from both
eating and sleeping. The Minister interviewed others who corroborated
her claims to long-term sickness. He reasoned that since she clearly
did not have the plague, an injection would not cure it; further, as she
was plague-free, she was not a hazard to those around her, and should
thus be allowed to forego plague measures.
The RSC, on his part, misunderstood the reasons for Pathoma’s
resistance. Interpreting part of the Princess’s hesitation as fear that the
plague treatment would interfere with her current medical regimen, he
asked the Minister of the Palace to inform the Princess that ‘the antiplague
vaccine will not hamper the action of the remedies administered by her
doctor’.77 This was a misinterpretation on the part of the RSC, since
Khmer medical practices often encouraged the concurrent use of
various treatments and pharmacopoeia for any given illness. Rather, it
would seem that the Princess believed the vaccination to be curative,
rather than preventative, for the plague. The RSC’s explanation did not
lead her to accept the serum. Logically, she assumed that she did not
need to be treated for a disease she did not have. In clarifying that she
did not have the disease, and failing to understand the basic conception
of contagion that was buttressing the French policies, she thus assumed
that no other measures were necessary. Since the serum’s purpose at
times was only preventative, and at other times both preventative and
curative, the confusion was understandable. Further, the types and uses
of the plague treatment were constantly changing.
77 NAC RSC 12622.
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Figure 5. The Khmer Council of Ministers, circa 1920. King Sisowath is sitting in the
centre. The Council members are in black. Prince Khanarac is wearing white, standing
behind the King immediately to his right. Thiounn, Minister of the Palace, is immediately
to the King’s left.
Courtesy of the NAC.
Shortly after Pathoma’s refusal, Neang Moth, a former concubine of
the deceased King Norodom, died. Moth’s daughter, Princess Souphana,
once again disobeyed health regulations and moved out before the
residence or the objects in it had been disinfected. She went to the home
of her husband, Prince Khanarac, bringing along Moth’s maid, Neang
Sam, who was at this time afflicted. Souphana moved the maid into
neighbouring Princess Sutharot’s house, where she died the following
day. Souphana may have believed that having the maid die in a neigh-
bour’s house exempted her husband’s home from plague measures.
However, this was not the case. With Sam’s death, both Khanarac’s
and Sutharot’s entire households became subject to plague measures
(see Figure 5). Khanarac and his entourage refused to comply with any
of the health procedures. As a concession, however, he informed the
doctor that he would be willing to be vaccinated at a later date.
Sisowath, prompted by the RSC, asked the Council of Ministers to
intervene with Khanarac. The Council called Khanarac to come before
it; the Prince, seemingly defiant, refused the summons. The Council
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then sent an envoy to his home to censure him. Khanarac was not pleased.
Rather than submitting to admonishment, he apparently scolded the
envoy, angered by the language of the initial council summons, and,
oddly enough, the disrespectful language of his admonishment. In his
view, he had not broken any law. The Prince informed the envoy that
he had not been vaccinated immediately after the widow’s death
because he had been both ill and occupied in planning Neang Moth’s
funeral, and had no time to become more sick with the vaccination.
Later, on 6 March, Khanarac wrote personally to the Council to
explain his actions further. He had been unable to appear before them
in their initial summons because his left foot was injured and he was
confined to his house. As to the doctor’s demands, he and his house-
hold had been unable to submit immediately to vaccination. If they
had, everyone would have been suffering its ill effects and nobody
would have been able to arrange the funeral for Moth. Since they had
submitted to the injections several days after the funeral, he saw no
harm to any party and little reason to continue dwelling upon the
matter. Echoing Col de Monteiro, he further argued that he was the
greatest proponent of French medicine among his peers; this made the
claims against him even more injurious.
Clearly, the death of Moth created conflicting obligations for surviv-
ing family members. The family was charged with planning and
implementing an extravagant funeral service suitable to Moth’s rank.
On the other hand, the medical services demanded that Khanarac and
his family submit immediately to vaccination. With Khanarac’s refusal,
we see again that the health services failed to explain the urgent need
for vaccination. In Khanarac’s view, vaccination was something of a
bureaucratic necessity, which, once performed, complied with new health
regulations. He did not perceive the direct link between expedited
vaccination and epidemic control. If he had submitted to vaccination
(with its negative side effects), his ability to cremate his mother-in-law
properly would have been hampered. The medical services did not take
into account the significance and intricacy of funeral rites for a member of
the royal entourage.78 They were of immediate importance and needed
the attention of family members. Also, the AM did not warn patients of
the debilitating effects of the vaccination, although these effects were
well known.
78 The importance of burial rites also hampered early attempts at disease-prevention
campaigns in Europe. Hardy, A. (1993), The Epidemic Streets: Infectious Disease
and the Rise of Preventive Medicine, 1856–1900, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 273.
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Figure 6. The Clayton Machine (Appareil Clayton) used to pump disinfectant into
contaminated houses and ships.
From a French Ministry of Colonies brochure, 1900.
Simple misunderstandings led to serious difficulties. The lack of
sufficient warning about the potential negative side effects of certain
procedures increased indigenous suspicion of new French medical
techniques. For example, when Prince Raya’s daughter died on 18
November 1914, Bonnigal sent a polite formal request for the Prince
and his entourage to come and bathe ‘with soap’ at the dispensary’s
new public bath. Raya refused this demand, telling the King that ‘After
the funeral rites, I allowed the doctor to vaccinate my family and house-
hold, and all developed a fever… In consequence, Highness, please
inform the doctors that I cannot go to the dispensary.’79 He added that
if the Municipal Doctor chose, he could bring Raya the medication and
soap and he would bathe at home. The bath probably had no long-term
side effects, but as a new technique, there was no way to know for
certain.
79 NAC RSC 12622.
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Epilogue to the plague
By the end of 1914, the municipal health service had various weapons
in its war with the plague. Not only was the municipality paying four
cents a head for ‘civilian’ rat collection, it had a disinfection crew and
state-of-the-art disinfection equipment that included a Clayton Machine
(see Figure 6), a Hercule pump and two Ligner machines, all designed
to spray, scour, fumigate and disinfect buildings and boats from a safe
distance. Despite the grumblings of the Mayor at the exaggeration of
the city’s rat problem by the health authorities, the municipality had
hired a dedicated rat-killing team consisting of 16 coolies, each paid
40 cents a day plus two cents per rat killed. From early November, four
rat-hunting dogs had been placed at their disposal.80
Over the course of several years in managing the epidemics, the
administration did become increasingly circumspect in its dealings with
royalty. In May 1916, two princesses, sisters in their 60s, died within a
few weeks of each other. Bonnigal, still the Municipal Doctor, believed
that they had succumbed to the plague. Due to the ‘corpulence’ of the
corpses as well as the opposition of their entourage, he was unable to
obtain an organ sample, and thus decided simply to assume it was the
plague. This time around, the health services also waited for the
written permission of the King before demolishing the house and
closing neighbouring houses for 10 days.81
One of the last plague conflicts with royalty on record involved,
appropriately enough, one of the characters from the initial conflicts.
This occurred in March 1918, when a 14-year-old girl named Sac died
of the plague. Sac worked as a servant in the palace, but lived off the
palace grounds. The AM injected her surviving family with the Yersin
serum, and disinfected her house with cresyl.82 On the day of Sac’s
demise, another widow of former King Norodom83 also died of the
plague, after again being isolated alone in a room, unattended and
unguarded. While the palace authorities presented Sac as the widow’s
attendant to medical staff, further investigation revealed that the
servant girl did not work for the deceased widow. She was actually a
servant to Princess Somphady. Somphady, as we will recall, was the
80 NAC RSC 2480.
81 NAC RSC 12622.
82 The preferred disinfectant, sulphurous gas, was not possible due to the state of the
home. A house needed to be relatively airtight and sturdy to be gassed.
83 King Norodom had had dozens of wives and concubines.
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sister of Duong Mathura, who had died of the plague seven years
earlier. Although the palace staff attempted to deflect attention from
the Princess by misrepresenting Sac’s employer, Somphady again
became subject to plague measures. The Princess, after seven years of
plague controversy, still refused, and no doubt had reason to refuse, to
be vaccinated and to have her home disinfected. The administration
decided this time not to force the issue.84
As this section has illustrated, the responses of the Khmer elite to
French medical measures ranged from open defiance to open collabo-
ration. Most fell somewhere in the middle. These vignettes also reveal
the intra-elite political negotiations among those with political power,
and their manoeuvres to maintain that power internally and vis à vis
the colonial state. In contrast, the non-elite did not have the leverage to
defy government authority with impunity. From their end came other
forms of defiance and negotiation. The second half of the article will
analyse responses from these less powerful individuals, including
ethnic minorities and the rural population.
Peasant responses
The analyses in this section are informed by the scholarship on
subalterns and peasant resistance. They are also influenced by studies
on contentious movements and collective action, particularly the work
of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow.85 Recent scholarship, most
pertinent in this context being James Scott’s work on South East Asia,86
contends that open, individual resistance from peasants in a traditional
society87 to unjust acts is not viable because the powerless have no
institutionalized protection from repercussions. Thus, they resort to
weapons such as foot-dragging, gossip and anonymous sabotage. Scott’s
analysis focused in large part on a contemporary village in Malaysia
84 NAC RSC 32226.
85 Tarrow, supra note 20; Tilly, C. (1986), The Contentious French, Belknap Press,
Cambridge; Tilly, C. (1995), Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
86 Scott, J. C. (1985), Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance,
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT; and Scott, J. C. (1990), Domination and the
Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
87 I take Scott to mean traditional society as one that controlled by traditional authority
versus, for example, a legal-bureacratic authority as defined by classical sociology.
See, for example, Weber, M. (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organiza-
tion, The Free Press, New York.
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and the social negotiations between poor farmer and native elite. In the
colonial context, this analysis might be extended to the powerlessness
of the highest echelons of native government, as a weaker group vis à
vis the colonizing power.88 As Michael Adas observes, a focus on less
dramatic acts ‘redirects our attention to the larger context in which
peasant communities operate and to their ongoing struggle to scale back
the demands of the state and elite groups and, thereby, retain enough of
what they produce to build decent lives for themselves’.89 These types
of ‘everyday resistance’ are often, by their clandestine nature, non-
confrontational. Here, I would like to focus on the methods the lower
classes had of confronting authority, acts slightly more extreme than
everyday resistance. In colonial Cambodia, we can identify three
major repertoires of confrontational contention: group demonstrations,
petition and evasion.90 These repertoires are distinct from some of the
methods of the elite classes because they are all collective actions.
Group demonstrations
The Cambodian lower classes rarely had the luxury of open, individual
defiance to the state, although the development of the newspaper, the
juridical system and other legal-bureacratic social structures would lead
to a shift in their methods of dissent later in the colonial period. Dis-
sension at the beginning of the twentieth century was often expressed
in ways that both concentrated the strength of the message being
delivered, and diffused, if not always erased, individual responsibility
through the group. The group demonstrations such as those after the
pig slaughter of 1907 and the palace torchings of 1908 constitute one
type of group protest. When the Council of Ministers opened an
inquest into the 1908 riots, its investigation was confronted with the
usual issue of the anonymity of the ‘mob’. Even if there may have been
some truth in the claims of the French administration that the protests
of 1,500 people in 1908 were engineered in part by the Khmer elite, the
88 As we saw, the Khmer elite frequently resorted to foot-dragging to avoid direct con-
flict, even if they were also able to employ open defiance in certain circumstances
with relative impunity.
89 Adas, M. (1992), ‘Comment on “From avoidance to confrontation”’, in Dirks, N. B.,
ed, Colonialism and Culture, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, pp 127–
134, 127.
90 My concept of ‘evasion’ is identical to Adas’s concept of ‘avoidance protest’, flight
or movement to escape the purview of certain political measures. Adas (and Scott)
contends that avoidance protest is openly challenging – it is meant to be noticed by
the authorities.
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protestors were also no doubt motivated by the panic and disorder caused
by misunderstanding and suspicion of French motives.91 Further, the
Council’s inability or unwillingness to place blame clearly was
facilitated by the nature of the act.
It would be incorrect to draw a strong distinction between the group
demonstration and the petition in the Khmer context. Often, as with the
1916 Affair and demonstrations over plague measures, a group would
gather first to voice complaints to the authorities – essentially present-
ing an oral petition – before resorting to violence. The division between
the two types of act appeared more pronounced as the Cambodian
population became more literate. In other words, petition cosmetically
changed to become a process of written complaint. Oral petitions also
became less legitimate because French observers tended to interpret
oral petitions and crowd demonstrations in a single inaccurate category
of mob violence. Although how Khmers express contention begins to
divide earlier in the colonial period, the reasons behind these acts, and
how authorities interpret them, do not necessarily change at the same
moment. I will examine a few specific cases of petition to further this
argument.
Petition
On 5 October 1914, the five chiefs of the Chinese congregations and
one chief of the Annamite congregation submitted a petition to the Mayor
of Phnom Penh demanding the relaxation of certain plague measures.
They requested that the eight-day mandatory closing of infected apart-
ments should be reduced to two or three days, with proprietors no longer
required to pay for disinfectant costs. In exchange for this, the
petitioners listed the terms they would accept.92 The section chiefs and
nearly 100 petitioners signed the petition in Chinese characters. Later
plague documents reveal that the duration of the closing of buildings
91 Crowd historian Rudé observed that scholars and authorities too readily discredit
the ability of the lower classes to organize spontaneously, and as such are quick to
identify outside agents of conspiracy. Rudé, G. (1964), The Crowd in History, 1730–
1848, Chapter 15, John Wiley & Sons, New York. Rudé argued in part against previous
crowd scholars such as Gustave LeBon, who portrayed most crowds as atavistic and
mindless.
92 These measures included: (1) annual whitewashing of buildings; (2) disinfection of
the ‘locale’ of a plague death (although presumably surrounding apartments and
buildings would be exempted); (3) closing of chambers for two to three days; and (4)
burning of belongings when absolutely necessary, in the presence of their owner.
NAC RSC 2480.
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was not appreciably reduced, although the use of fire tapered off over
the next few years. This may have been due more to financial
exigencies than conciliatory politics. The Kampot Medical Chief noted
of housing incinerations that,
[i]n reality, their destruction by fire creates major inconveniences: loss of money
for the inhabitants, because the indemnity never covers the cost of a new hut,
and loss of housing for those who are thrown on the street. For these reasons, the
administration decided at some time in the beginning [of the epidemic] that it
would content itself with the removal of the roofs of these contaminated habita-
tions, and to leave their interiors exposed to the air, rain and sun, the best natural
disinfecting agents, for a certain number of days.93
In any case, the burning of commercial goods was of greater concern
to the Chinese than the incineration of their homes; richer than their
Khmer neighbours, their homes were often built of materials sufficiently
sturdy to enable chemical disinfection rather than total destruction. As
in the case of the mob protests, the government was quick to blame the
merchants’ complaints on outside agitation. The Mayor fingered a French
entrepreneur named Portret who lived in Mytho (Cochin-China), a
proprietor of many buildings in Phnom Penh, as the source of the
Chinese complaints.94 Although the Mayor may have labelled Portret
as the instigator to discredit the Chinese complaints, it is likely that
Portret merely participated in formulating the grievance. As a French-
man, he would have been more versed in methods of negotiation with
the colonial government. This petition may have played only a small
role in assisting the Chinese in obtaining concessions from the colonial
state. However, it did help establish a pattern of productive communi-
cation between the two groups that continued through the colonial era.
On 21 April 1924, the Cham population on the Chruy Changwar
peninsula filed a petition with the Résident Supérieur. Champa was an
ancient kingdom that was gradually absorbed by the southward expan-
sion of the Vietnamese after the fifteenth century. The Cham people,
remnants of this kingdom, had dispersed into parts of Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia, where they maintained themselves as a somewhat
distinct group with their own language, customs and the Islamic
religion. Due to their Islamic religion, the French often referred to them
as Malays or ‘musulmans’. In terms of public health, they were a mild
thorn in the side of the French administration. Among the indigenous
93 NAC RSC 630. 1924 Kampot Annual Report.
94 NAC RSC 2480.
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population, they had a reputation as powerful sorcerers, including in
the medical arts. The Cham practice of ‘variolation’, outlawed since
1919, and their continued refusal of smallpox vaccinations was, in the
French view, a constant obstruction to the eradication of smallpox in
the colony. The French had issued a circular on 25 February 1919
authorizing the expulsion of foreigners who practised variolation, as
well as fines and jail for all others.95 Although many of the Cham
communities had lived for centuries in Cambodia, French observers
viewed them as ‘a world somewhat apart from the indigenous world’.96
As such, they had the strange status of being classified as foreigners
when bureaucratic expediency demanded it. The wording of the
circular left this ethnic group vulnerable to expulsion, although the
Chinese communities also persisted in practising a form of nasal-swab
variolation and were likely to have been the primary target of the
circular.97
With the exception of the largely unenforced legislation on variolation,
Chams were left largely to their own devices. In previous years, the
Cham community was outside the jurisdiction of public health
measures in the main part of the Phnom Penh municipality, although
its proximity to Phnom Penh had led to some death registrations, as
witnessed by the first case of 1908. But the Chruy Changwar commu-
nity became the newest quarter of Phnom Penh in 1924 (the sixth), and
had to accept a new dispensary in its midst. To their great displeasure,
the Chams found themselves suddenly under the purview of French
sanitary law.
Submitted in French, the petition had over 300 signatories, names
signed in both the Khmer and Arabic alphabet.98 The petitioners were
willing to accept all sanitary measures with the exception of the
autopsy, which violated the laws of Mohammad. An autopsied cadaver,
they explained, could no longer be mummified in the way Islamic
religious death rites demanded. They argued that ‘autopsies practised
95 NAC RSC 18290, Circular #28, 25 February 1919.
96 NAC RSC 680. Fabry’s 1924 Kompong Cham Annual Report.
97 For more information on the competition between vaccination and variolation in
Cochin-China, see Annick Guénel’s two articles: Guénel, A. (1996), ‘La lutte
antivariolique en Extrême-Orient: Ruptures et continuité’, in Moulin, A. M., ed,
L’Aventure de la Vaccination, Fayard, Paris, pp 82–94; and Guénel, A. (1995), ‘Lutte
contre la variole en Indochine: Variolisation contre vaccination’, History and
Philosophy of the Life Sciences, Vol 17, pp 55–70.
98 The Cham language had no specific written alphabet at the time. Written communi-
cation and religious learning were undertaken in Arabic.
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on the cadavers of Cambodians, Annamites, and Chinese, which their
religions permit, should be sufficient in permitting the public health
services to combat epidemic microbes’.99 The assumption that the health
services would be able to carry out its duties by filling a quota of
autopsies reveals, once again, that the subject populations had a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the purpose of surveillance or the diagnostics
of plague. The purpose of epidemiological tracking was not simply to
collect a certain number of samples, but to monitor and control the
disease. The Cham population concurrently submitted a petition in
Khmer to the Khmer Council of Ministers, in which, beyond the com-
plaints it presented to the French, it added that the French doctors exposed
the intimate parts of Cham women, an act also contrary to the laws of
Mohammad.
Municipal Doctor Bouvaist saw little merit in the complaint. In his
opinion, the use of the word ‘autopsy’ was incorrect and exaggerated,
since the municipal staff only removed ‘a fragment of hepatic pulp and
a bit of crural ganglion’ from each corpse.100 All other ethnic groups
including Europeans and the Indian ‘musulmans’ submitted to these
measures, and the Chruy Changwar population could not be exempted,
particularly since the dispensary of Chruy Changwar had been installed
principally to monitor epidemic diseases. However, the RSC, to be thor-
ough, requested an investigation by the Khmer Council of Ministers.
The resultant study found that in the process of mummifying, the Chams
massaged the gut of the dead ‘to expel from the anus all that could be
expelled’ (pour en faire sortir par l’anus toute ce qui peut sortir). ‘[T]he
incision produced at the level of the liver to obtain a sample of this
organ, wasn’t sutured, [and] the intestines spill out through this incision at
the moment of the stomach massage.’ This, understandably, upset the
sensibilities of surviving family members. Health Director Vallet gave
the rather perfunctory order that after taking the liver sample, the medical
staff were to suture the gut of the corpse to prevent the intestines from
extruding. No other concessions were granted to the Chams.101
Petitions were not organized solely in Phnom Penh, and did not
99 NAC RSC 1347. Petition dated 21 April 1924.
100 By the 1920s, diagnostics were often done on a sample of a major organ rather than
on a simple blood or lymph sample. This was in part due to the desire to avoid
upsetting the population by performing too intimate an examination. Ironically, a
liver sample was less intrusive than examination of a swollen bubo under the arm or
at the groin. NAC RSC 1346.
101 NAC RSC 1347.
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involve just the plague, although the colonial administration’s constant
preoccupation with the plague leaves a particularly good record with
regard to this disease. There are some modest petitions against other
aspects of the medical service. In 1931, the inhabitants of Kompong
Cham submitted a group petition against the local medical chief,
Dr Fabry. In their complaint, written in Khmer and translated into French,
the townsfolk listed several wide-ranging grievances against the
doctor.102 Fabry, it seems, was not simply a bad doctor, but also an
abusive human being. Of the litany of complaints against Fabry, the
most detailed concern his favourable treatment of rich Vietnamese over
poor Khmer.103 Further, Fabry’s wife participated in the exploitation,
verbally abusing staff, co-opting them for domestic work, and occa-
sionally sending them to buy her groceries with their own money. The
hospital support staff and townsfolk claimed that the doctor had seized
the lands of several peasants and claimed them as his own. The
petitioners pleaded with the administration to open a wider investiga-
tion, because the doctor was a very ‘clever liar’ to his superiors.104 It
seems there was no investigation, and there is no record of any
disciplinary action against Dr Fabry. But the petition was not wholly
ineffective: he was removed from Kompong Cham. This move was a
boon for both the citizens of Kompong Cham and for Fabry. In 1932,
the Health Director moved him to a more desirable posting, replacing
the disgraced Dr Escale as the attending doctor at the Mixed Hospital,
Phnom Penh.105
We have scattered references to group petitions on more mundane
issues, for example in 1936 and again in 1938, the indigenous nursing
staff submitted a group petition for a pay rise.106 They submitted their
petition to the Health Director, and also, innovatively, to the
newspaper. The use of the newspaper for a petition was a relatively
new development in the 1930s, placing these issues in a public forum
for discussion. As one journalist opined, ‘if at the hospital one hears
many patients complain of the negligence of the personnel, one need
not be too surprised. How can we expect conscientious service from
employees whom the Administration has treated with a total lack of
102 Only the French translation exists in the record.
103 NAC RSC 14582.
104 NAC RSC 14582.
105 NAC RSC 23033.
106 NAC RSC 11996.
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conscience?’107 This support for the indigenous nursing staff continues
through the late 1930s in colonial newspapers such as La Verité, La
Press Indochinoise and the Echo du Cambodge. The early 1939 articles in
the Khmer edition of the Echo du Cambodge are also the first examples of
an effort to garner public support in relation to a medical issue that I
have found in the Khmer language.108 The appeal to the ‘public’ for
support, and indeed, the very idea of a ‘public opinion’ challenging
authority marks a significant shift in the concept of political power and
authority.
Written petitions are phenomena of urban centres, where the
populations were relatively educated and literate. On occasion, these
petitions were submitted concurrently to both the Khmer administra-
tion and the French colonial government. Some, it appears, were
submitted solely to the French colonial government. Although few
records survive of Khmer administration during the colonial era, it is
reasonable to speculate that the reverse happened just as often. In other
words, petitions were submitted to the Khmer administration without
being forwarded to the colonial government. This is supported by the
evidence we have of group demonstrations and oral petitions. Con-
sider that for the largely illiterate peasant populations, petitioners
travelled personally to lodge complaints en masse and always to
representatives of the indigenous government. Again, the nature of such
protest would preclude its inclusion in the historical record. Only
personal petitions of the largest and most unusual sort, such as the 1916
Affair, survive in the archives. One rare exception occurred in June
1920, when the villagers of the small town of Moung-Russey in the
western province of Battambang came en masse to their town chief to
request the temporary release of an illegal variolator named Chau Pech.
The unfortunate Pech had been detained in the Battambang provincial
centre, a victim of one of the occasional AM attempts to enforce its
anti-variolation legislation. The village chief wrote a letter on behalf
of his villagers to the Khmer provincial governor, who forwarded his
request to the French résident of Battambang. The villagers asked for
Pech to be temporarily released for 15 days to complete his inocula-
tions of the village. They clearly did not see the reasoning behind the
incarceration of Pech – namely, to prevent him from performing these
107 La Verité, ‘Messieurs faites vous infirmiers. Soyez infirmières Mesdames’, 18 Janu-
ary 1936.
108 NAC newspaper collections and newspaper clippings, 1936–39.
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‘dangerous’ variolations. Some of the village children were already
developing smallpox, and the villagers, while not understanding why
he was imprisoned, believed that his temporary release was vital for
their health. The French medical chief refused the request; however, he
sent the indigenous médecin immediately to vaccinate the entire
region.109
Ultimately, the group demonstrations and oral petitions take place at
the site of Khmer authority and not French. Demonstrators went before
the king, the mandarin and the village chief – not the RSC, the AM
doctor or the mayor. Cambodia was technically under a system of
indirect rule. The ‘traditional’ Khmer ruling classes remained the buffer
between colonial administration and most of the population. While their
actual power to make political decisions was in large part illusory, Khmer
elite authority in the eyes of the peasantry was clearly still legitimate.
If petition in Europe shifted in the late eighteenth century from the
‘tool of private interests seeking redress to a public act seeking justice
in the name of general moral claims’,110 in the South East Asian
context, the petition is an established pre-modern form of collective
action against the state.111 These distinctions point to a fundamental
difference in the perceived relationship between the individual and the
state in the Khmer and French interpretation, differences to which I
will return in the final discussion.
Evasion
As the stories of the plague reveal, the purpose of local action, or
reaction, was often simply to escape the purview of French medicine.
Other acts attempted to notify the elite of state measures viewed as
unacceptable by the population at large. As we have also seen, con-
structive measures such as petitions were discouragingly ineffective,
while more destructive acts such as rioting seemed more effective.
However, destructive acts, by their very nature, were not simply
damaging to the French administration, but to local life as well. More
109 NAC RSC 7634.
110 Tarrow, supra note 20, at p 38.
111 Group oral petitions have precedents throughout South East Asia. For example,
Takaishi Shiraishi describes ‘nggogol’ as a pre-communist legitimate form of col-
lective action whereby a group of individuals complains in person to the authorities.
Shiraishi, T. (1990), An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. Michael Adas also discusses the com-
mon use of this method in pre-colonial Java and Burma. Adas, supra note 17, at
p 229.
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often than not, when faced with measures that they either did not
understand or simply disliked, Khmers did what Khmers have done for
centuries; they fled the net of authority. In South East Asia, a region
where human populations were a more vital resource than territory,
group flight was a traditional means of pressuring regional governors
to ease demands upon local populations.112 For the plague, urban dwellers
fled not only from the city of Phnom Penh, but also from smaller
afflicted towns. The seaside town of Kampot saw periodic flights with
each epidemic. Municipal doctors registered a handful of plague deaths
among those smuggled out of the provincial centre of Prey Veng when
already sick.113 Dr Haelwyn, the Municipal Doctor of Battambang
complained,
As soon as an epidemic breaks out, the inhabitants avoid coming to alert the
authorities because, more than the disease, they fear our methods of prevention
and disinfection, which they consider troublesome.... The population carefully
hides its sick, furtively buries its dead.114
In 1910, the Health Director commented that the Phnom Penh Munici-
pal Doctor spent more of his time trying to track down suspicious cases
than in treating the sick.115 In an extreme example, Dr Bernard Menaut
spent months in 1916 trying to locate three monks at Wat Sarawan in
Phnom Penh who refused to be vaccinated.116 People fled not only from
epidemic measures. For example, in 1928, two young women
112 See Adas, M. (1998), ‘From footdragging to flight: the evasive history of peasant
avoidance protest in South and Southeast Asia’, Essay 2, State, Market, and Peasant
in Colonial South and Southeast Asia, Ashgate, Brookfield, VT; Reid, A. (1988),
Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: 1450–1680, Volume One: The Lands Below
the Winds, Chapter 2, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT; Tarling, N., ed (1992),
The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume 2 part one: From c.1800 to the
1930s, Vol 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 110. See also the collected
essays in Kerkvliet, B. J. T., and Scott, J., eds (1986), Everyday Forms of Peasant
Resistance in Southeast Asia, Frank Cass, Totowa, NJ.
113 NAC RSC 9631.
114 NAC RSC 1315, 1346.
115 NAC RSC 1315.
116 The monks, visiting from another wat, had stood by watching while the public health
officials were burning the cell of a dead monk. When they refused vaccination, the
attendant recorded their names along with a few other local monks who had refused
vaccination. The monks of Wat Sarawan were soon vaccinated due to pressure from
the achaar, but these three could not be found. With the hope that their higher vis-
ibility as monks would aid in their discovery, the public health officials enlisted the
aid of the Khmer Council of Ministers in locating these individuals. Information led
Menaut to the hinterlands of Mandap, where several weeks of wandering and ques-
tioning led him nowhere. NAC RSC 1315.
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disappeared while being transported to Saigon to complete rabies treat-
ment after being bitten by rabid dogs. The Health Director wrote in
exasperation, ‘Perhaps, would it be possible to seek these patients with
the use of the police, and to get their families to understand the danger
that follows from their lack of foresight?’117
Meanings and motives
One of the key ambitions in agrarian studies is to explore the meanings
and motives behind peasant resistance and rebellion. James Scott has
argued that peasant politics is imbued with an essentially moral economy.
The moral economy of peasants makes them less inclined to individual
high-risk behaviour and more inclined to communal risk sharing. They
have a greater desire to minimize the probability of disaster than to
maximize possible return – in other words, they care much more about
what is left rather than what is taken. Thus peasants are more likely to
rebel when safety nets are threatened.118 The social unrest discussed
above certainly cannot be called full-scale rebellion. However, the wide-
spread disorder in Phnom Penh during the first two years of plague can
illuminate at least some motivations for peasant protest, identifying
acts sufficiently unbearable to drive the unprotected to resist. In fact,
one could argue that the less politically grandiose nature of the events
examined above provides a more quotidian perspective on peasant
resistance. Such acts are a historically neglected middle ground
between everyday resistance and revolution.
The events following the ‘ridiculous pig incineration’ would seem to
support the idea of moral economy. Khmer families raised (and still
raise) pigs as an important security for times of famine or economic
hardship. As such, their killing would eliminate an important economic
safety net for the poorest people. Before the pig killings, the AM
117 NAC RSC 1156.
118 Scott, J. C. (1976), The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence
in Southeast Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Scott has his critics, most
notable among them being Samuel Popkin, who wrote against Scott and other moral
economy proponents such as Eric Wolf and Clifford Geertz. He argued that peasants
were essentially ‘rational’. They operated within a political economy as much or
more than in a moral economy worldview. In Popkin’s formulation, peasants re-
belled because they were both anticolonial and antifeudal, recognizing their
exploitation from both ‘premodern’ and colonial structures. Popkin, S. L. (1979),
The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, Univer-
sity of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
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had removed physical samples of the deceased and dying without
family consent, taken the sick forcibly to the lazaret, and injected
villagers with serum. These were acts upon human bodies, living
human beings. Yet they did not cause rioting. The demonstrations
began immediately with the pig killings. However, a direct connection
between the slaughter and the rioting cannot be too strongly drawn.
First, the pig killings coincided with the first deaths in the Khmer
quarter. The Sino–Khmer population had had to contend with public
health measures before the Khmer population, which may have been
somewhat insulated from the measures in the Chinese quarter. Thus,
the poorer Khmer population would have been presented with several
frightening and bewildering behaviours at once in their initial inter-
action with French public health measures. Indeed, the only obvious
link between the killing of pigs, painful injections and the frightening
new disease in their midst was the French authorities. The larger riots
of the second year support this. The perceived lack of respect for Khmer
dead, particularly the lack of respect for the woman’s corpse, was the
main objection during the second-year protests and in the investigation
that followed. However, as crowd historian Rudé pointed out, a crowd
is heterogeneous in its aims and motivations, even if it crystallizes around
a central issue, and the nature of a crowd is evolving, often changing
goals during the process of protest.119 While the pig killings certainly
drove many townsfolk to doubt both the good intentions and perhaps
the sanity of the local health services, the home invasions and offence
to modesty committed by the military doctor had created preconditions
for resentment and distrust.
The rumours cited by the colonial government also point to another
significant difference in indigenous understandings of what was
occurring.120 If they used their recent history as a basis of judgment,
the Khmer population could interpret the intense French involvement
only as negative. People were not fleeing the plague. People were flee-
ing the French measures against the plague. The danger of ‘contagion’
was not seen to be as threatening as the tangible dangers represented
by French measures to counteract contagion. Further, the reality of the
pain resulting from the Yersin injection, and the loss of security from
119 Rudé, supra note 91, Chapter 1.
120 For a provocative essay on the role of rumour in facilitating indigenous interpreta-
tions of foreign technologies, see White, L. (1993), ‘Cars out of place: vampires,
technology, and labor in East and Central Africa’, Representations, Vol 43, pp 27–
50.
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the killing of a pig was a greater impetus to flight than the abstract
notion of contagion. Villagers were not fleeing vaccinations; they were
fleeing the volatile European. The Moung-Roussey villagers did not
want a ‘modern’ vaccinator; they wanted their variolator returned. In
fact, the Kompong Cham petition against Fabry was one of the rare
complaints against a doctor for not doing his job. As the section on
evasion revealed, the general population seemed to want little more
than to be left alone.
In all, the actions of the Khmer population, elite and peasant,
crystallize around issues of respect and morality. For instance, Fabry’s
land-grabbing was almost a footnote in the Kampong Cham petition,
whereas his more favourable treatment of a richer Vietnamese than a
Khmer, and his wife’s abusive treatment of staff were emphasized in
detail. For the living, the perception of respect in personal interactions
was far more important than physical force on the living body.
Although people fled or refused vaccinations, almost no complaints
were registered against the evacuation of the sick to the lazarets or the
examinations of the living. The greatest complaints were against the
physical treatment of the dead, rather than the treatment of the living.
These incidents particularly reveal that the woman’s body was a highly
privileged domain. In contrast to much of the existing scholarship on
peasant politics in South East Asia, which relies heavily on
economic models, these vignettes emphasize the importance of
perceived respect in personal reactions. Economics can often be
secondary to other motivations for resistance. These middle-ground
events reveal both pragmatic/rational and emotional responses to
unreasonable demands from individuals and from the state.
Despite colonial efforts at public dissemination of information,
epidemic measures ultimately led to conflicts. In large part, this was
because of French misunderstanding of the fundamental reasoning
behind local choices. Too often, officials lumped Khmer behaviour into
obscuring categories of faint-heartedness, prudishness or contrariness.
On the Khmer side, understanding was no clearer. Pathoma’s refusal to
be vaccinated, the notion of quota in the Cham petition, Khanarac’s
lackadaisical postponement of vaccination, the pig killings, the request
for the imprisoned variolator, the flight of the girls undergoing rabies
treatment – all these examples show that the Khmer population
misunderstood and deeply distrusted French medicine. Naturally, they
wanted nothing to do with it.
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Dual polities
The process of medical imposition occurred concurrently with state
imposition in Cambodia. In other words, the AM was established at
approximately the same time as the French colonial government had
the will and the means to infiltrate peasant society. The formation of
the colonial state was a top-down process of establishing authority. We
have no detailed studies of the relationship between the Khmer state
and society in the period immediately preceding French colonialism.
We do have a general model, however, in Clifford Geertz’s formula-
tion of the ‘theatre state’. Geertz claims that the pre-colonial South
East Asian state was actuated from the bottom up. He writes,
The right to command was not delegated from king to lord, lord to lordling, and
lordling to subject; rather, it was surrendered from subject to lordling, lordling
to lord, and lord to king. Power was not allocated from the top, it was cumulated
from the bottom. This is not to say that the system was democratic, which it
certainly was not; nor that it was libertarian, which it was even less. It is to say
that it was – radically, pervasively, inveterately – confederate.121
Within this system, ‘[t]he driving aim of higher politics was to con-
struct a state by constructing a king. The more consummate the king,
the more exemplary the center. The more exemplary the center, the
more actual the realm.’122 The right of the king to govern, to convince
those beneath to surrender power to him, was determined by his ability
to display this exemplary centre on earth through pomp. In contrast, in
the framework of European government, ‘the office of the dignified
parts is to serve the efficient, that they are artifices, more or less
cunning, more or less illusional, designed to facilitate the prosier aims
of role. Political symbology...is but the instrument of purposes
concealed beneath it or towering above it.’123 How well Geertz’s model
would satisfy a detailed study of pre-colonial Cambodia is uncertain.
Thus, it is only presented here as one hypothetical model of the
relationship between the Khmer government and its people. However,
we can reasonably speculate that the relationship between the ruler
and ruled in Cambodia was fundamentally changed with the imposi-
tion of colonialism. Moreover, there was a disjuncture between the
pre-colonial and colonial form of government and the way non-state
121 Geertz, C. (1980), Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp 62–63.
122 Ibid, p 124.
123 Geertz, supra note 121, at p 122.
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actors interpreted acts of this foreign state. Ultimately, ‘[t]he symbols
of collective action cannot be simply read like a “text”, independent of
the conditions in which they struggle. Nor are they simple projections
of indigenous culture into political strategies.’124 They are chosen,
‘frames’ to relate text to context, to present claims effectively both
within the protesting group and to the authority.
At the minimum, two conceptions of the state coexisted for much of
the colonial period. The way in which the majority of the indigenous
actors conceived of the state did not change the moment formal control
of government changed. While the two ideologies of state necessarily
collided at some point, most histories take it as a given that the ‘real-
ity’ of colonial domination immediately informed peasant response to
colonial/state action. This can be inaccurate. One subaltern scholar of
India, writing against the tendency to describe peasant behaviour as
non-political, argues, ‘The semiotics of domination and subordination
were what the subaltern sought to destroy every time they rose up in
rebellion’.125 Such acts, according to some subalternists, are inherently
political, anticolonial and antifeudal.126 However, these stories of
medicine in Cambodia reveal that indigenous society did not
immediately react to colonial hegemony as modern political actors
against a Western concept of the state. In other words, the statement
needs qualification in the Khmer context. The acts of resistance were
political, but were originally framed within a pre-existing concept of
polity. If within the theatre state there are in a sense no ‘non-state’
actors (since the people actuate the state), then these collective acts of
‘resistance against the state’ could more accurately be viewed as
expressions of ‘negotiation within the state’. While the populace may
have viewed it as such, the colonial state (and many post-colonial
scholars) interpreted it within a Western political trajectory as a much
more significant rupture. A political shift did occur in the colonial
period, but it did not occur immediately.
Confrontational acts must thus be read in the context of both Khmer
political systems and the French colonial government. The Khmer
peasantry were acting politically, but they were in fact often attempt-
ing to negotiate with and correct another, different concept of the state.
The French colonial government, the effective state, responded in
124 Tarrow, supra note 20, at p 109.
125 Chakrabarty, D. (2000), ‘Subaltern studies and postcolonial historiography’, Nepantla:
Views from the South, Vol 1, No 1, pp 1–32, pp 17–18.
126 This is reminiscent of Popkin’s formulation of the rational peasant; see note 118.
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unexpected ways, and this created further misunderstanding.
Moreover, the Khmer elite, Chinese minorities and other groups had
still different understandings of their relationship to the colonial
government and expressed their resistance in a variety of ways. But
their relationships with each other and with the French colonial
government were also being renegotiated throughout the colonial
period. To understand the motivations for their actions, we must keep
in mind the gradual, if transformative, aspects of the imposition of both
Western medicine and the Western bureaucratic state.
Archival sources
Archives of the Institut Pasteur (AIP), Paris
Archives of the Société Asiatique, Fonds Aymonier, Paris
National Archives of Cambodia, Collection of the Résidence Supérieur du Cambodge
(NAC RSC), Phnom Penh
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